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10,000 border guards  
for Frontex:
Why the EU risks 
conflated expectations
“Between now and 2027 we want to produce an 
additional 10,000 border guards. We are now going 
to bring that forward to 2020,” Jean-Claude Juncker, 
the President of the European Commission, told 
Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz at the start of 
Austria’s sixth-months presidency of the Council of the 
European Union (EU) on 1 July 2018.1 In his State of 
the European Union (SOTEU) speech on 12 September, 
the Commission President confirmed this number and 
provided a blueprint for the future of Frontex.2 For the 
EU, the proposed increase in Frontex’s resources will 
likely become a key argument to counter criticism from 
populist parties and demonstrate its determination to 
manage migration effectively. 
For the EU, the proposed increase in 
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These proposals consolidate Frontex’s position as a 
central component of the EU response to curb unwanted 
migration. This policy brief looks at the opportunities 
and challenges posed by allocating additional resources 
to Frontex, including an operating staff of 10,000 by 
2020. It traces the development and role of this EU 
border management agency, with a particular focus on 
the post-2015 migration crisis period. While it finds that 
this young EU body has already grown significantly in 
resources and operations, it concludes that there are 
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many questions left unaddressed related to its mandate. 
We argue that focusing solely on the number of border 
guards at its disposal – and Frontex’s capacities in 
general – risks creating a “capability-expectation gap”, 
whereby the public may develop conflated expectations 
towards Frontex.3 Regulating migratory flows effectively 
requires a more comprehensive approach than merely 
strengthening Frontex further.
BACKGROUND – FRONTEX AND EU BORDER 
MANAGEMENT
Together with the Eurozone, the Schengen area stands 
out as a quintessential EU project. Its benefits extend 
not only to the free movement of people but also to 
economic growth in the Union, with the suspension of 
Schengen estimated to cost anywhere between EUR 5 
and EUR 18 billion per year.4 To protect this area, the 
EU designed a series of measures, including the creation 
of Frontex, an EU agency responsible for coordinating 
external border controls among responsible agencies 
of individual member states. In operation since 1 May 
2005, Frontex is one of the fastest growing EU agencies 
regarding budget and staff. As illustrated in the graph 
below, its growth is particularly striking when compared 
to that of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
the EU agency engaged in the development of a 
Common European Asylum System.
The original mandate of Frontex was limited in 
purpose, focusing on the coordination of border control 
operations, preparing risk assessments and assisting 
member states with training and return missions. 
Fairly quickly, the EU border management agency 
saw an expansion of competences with the creation 
of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) in 2007 





states under exceptional migration pressures. However, 
Frontex’s most significant boost in competences came 
in the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis. After 
only about a year of negotiations, EU member states 
turned Frontex into a European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (EBCGA). Launched in October 2016, the 
EBCGA was dubbed “Frontex+” because of its additional 
resources and competences such as the power to 
initiate EU return flights for irregular migrants and 
more responsibilities countering organised crime and 
smuggling of human beings.
Several controversial EBCGA proposals were watered 
down or left unaddressed as a result of the negotiations. 
The first of them referred to the EBCGA’s ‘right to 
intervene’ without explicit permission in a member 
state unable to cope in a crisis because of systemic 
flaws in managing its borders. In effect, this would have 
meant a considerable shift of sovereignty in the name 
of a more functional and centralised EU border control 
regime. Several member states, notably those at the EU’s 
external borders such as Greece and Italy, found the 
measure too far-reaching. The final compromise allows 
the EU to re-introduce internal border controls for those 
member states unwilling to cooperate with Frontex 
in a migration crisis.5 A second controversial proposal 
involved Frontex’s ‘right to return irregular migrants 
even before they enter the EU which raised complicated 
questions about chains of responsibility and human 
rights implications.
Despite its rapid growth, Frontex’s efficiency in carrying 
out its operations remains dependent on voluntary 
contributions from EU member states. According to its 
latest governance report of 2017, the agency employed 
more than 1,700 officers from member states in its 
operations6, and could count on a rapid reaction pool 
of 1,500 officers, along with additional ships, aircraft 
and equipment. Its staff grew by a third, to 488, in 2017 
alone, the first year of the new EBCG regulation, with 
the objective to double it in 2018.7 A similar boost is 
expected for the agency’s budget, which totalled EUR 
302 million in 2017. Ongoing negotiations for the 
EU’s future Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 
for 2021-2027 have placed migration control as a top 
priority8, with the EC proposing a total of EUR 11.3 
billion or an average of EUR 1.6 billion annually.9
STATE OF PLAY – A NEW MOMENTUM FOR 
STRENGTHENING FRONTEX10
The rise of populist parties in several member states and 
the upcoming European Parliament elections in May 
2019 have added new momentum to debates about how 
to strengthen EU external border controls. In the words 
of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the fate of the EU 
may depend on its ability to face the “make or break” 
migration challenge.11
Consequently, migration was at the top of an ambitious 
agenda for the June 2018 European Council and featured 
prominently in the SOTEU speech in September. After 
intense discussions, European heads of state and 
government agreed on a few new measures such as 
‘disembarkation centres’ on the territories of third 
countries for migrants rescued at high sea. More 
ambitious proposals including reforming the Dublin 
asylum system with a compulsory relocation system did 
not materialise. These outcomes show that the EU tends 
to agree primarily on more stringent external border 
controls and the externalisation of these prerogatives 
to third countries. The EU’s externalisation agenda, 
however, depends on the cooperation of countries of 
origin and transit – a hurdle that has often proven 
difficult to surmount. It leaves the EU with the option of 
focusing on strengthening its own external borders, with 
Frontex as a principal actor in that regard.
In his SOTEU speech on 12 September, Jean-Claude 
Juncker provided a blueprint for the reform of Frontex. 
Its goal is to provide the agency with a “standing corps 
of 10,000 operational EU staff with executive power and 
their own equipment” to permit the EU to “intervene 
wherever and whenever needed.”12 Out of the EUR 11.3 
billion total Frontex budget proposed for the 2021-
2027 period, the Commission foresees a total of EUR 
2.2 billion alone for purchasing necessary equipment. 
Under the Commission’s proposal, the agency’s standing 
corps would not station at the Frontex headquarters 
in Warsaw. Instead, there would be 7,000 staff from 
member states available for short- or long-term 
deployments by 2020, with the agency responsible for 
deployment costs. As shown in the chart below, this staff 
will gradually decrease in favour of statuary staff at the 
agency or long-term secondment from member states.
To function effectively, Frontex would need not only 
more money and staff but also an increased willingness 
from member states to share their sovereignty. Whether 
there is sufficient political will today to give Frontex 
the power to intervene in the absence of the permission 
of a host country remains unclear. President Juncker 
approached this issue carefully. On the one hand, he 
emphasised the role of member states, stressing that 
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even after the reforms Frontex would “not take over the 
national responsibility to protect the Union’s external 
borders,” a competency that “is and will remain a 
Member State prerogative”.13 In other words, operations 
would remain under the control and command of the 
host member state. On the other hand, Frontex would 
get special powers in emergency situations, and it would 
be up to the Commission (and no longer the Council!) to 
decide whether Frontex has the right to intervene.
Under the Commission proposal, Frontex would 
acquire some of the same competences as those 
currently carried out by national border guards, such 
as performing identity checks, authorising or refusing 
entry at border crossing points, stamping travel 
documents, patrolling borders, and intercepting persons 
who have crossed the border irregularly. While the 
Commission notes these activities would take place 
under the “authority and control of the host Member 
State”, it is likely that Frontex would develop a high 
degree of autonomy in these matters, including practical 
return procedures.
EU member states – as well as the European Parliament 
– are still in the process of analysing the Commission 
proposal presented during the SOTEU. It seems that 
their near unanimous support for stronger EU external 
border controls will not translate, at the end of the 
day, into their endorsement of an additional transfer 
of sovereignty to Brussels. The ‘right to intervene’ in 
the absence of a member state approval may prove too 
intrusive for many governments to accept. The populist 
parties currently in power in Italy, Hungary and some 
other member states prize ‘sovereignty’ and ‘national 
borders’ above all other matters. 
The creation of such a large pool of border guards will 
also bring up a range of practical questions. Training is 
one of them. The Commission suggests that the corps 
shall receive “common training” without specifying 
what it implies in practice. Will a reformed European 
border guard supersede the need for national border and 
coast guard forces and academies? Should the European 
Commission support common EU border guard 
academies instead?
PROSPECTS – FRONTEX SHOULD NOT BE THE 
SOLE SOLUTION TO A MULTIFACETED ISSUE
If approved, the proposal will constitute a big step for 
a more efficient Frontex. While it falls short of a one-
time ‘big bang’ towards more ‘supranationalisation’ 
and centralisation, it would extend the autonomy and 
capacity of the agency. There seems to be a momentum 
in the EU to grant more competences, staff and funds to 
the agency. 
As the EU moves forward with its proposals to reform 
Frontex, a few practical and political considerations 
should be taken into account:
•  From a governance perspective, Juncker’s approach 
seeks to strike a delicate balance between a 
functional need for a more centralised EU border 
control regime and national prerogatives for 
sovereignty. The proposal may, however, tilt the 
scale in favour of the Commission, whose proposal 
limits the extent to which member states could 
control Frontex compared to the current situation. 
Frontex would acquire more staff, equipment and 
resources, and some member states may even 
face national shortages of their border guards 
because of their commitments to the Frontex 
pool. Closer coordination between individual 
member states and Frontex would also be critical 
for the success of the agency’s operations. A 
recent Migration Policy Institute report on the EU 
response to the 2015 migration crisis noted that 
there is limited intra-agency communication, as 
well as challenging exchanges of information and 
coordination between member states, particularly 
in crises.14 Consequently, more efforts are required 
to streamline the exchange of information between 
Frontex, other EU institutions, and member states – 
as well as third countries.
•  In terms of accountability, Frontex already operates 
in a field with high stakes concerning human 
rights and civil liberties. Any additional transfer of 
powers to this EU agency could raise concerns about 
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potential breaches of human rights. Accountability 
would become even more important if Frontex 
were granted a greater role in the creation and 
management of the ‘disembarkation centres’ in 
third countries. In that regard, on the day before 
the European Council, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) – 
both of which are expected to have a role to play in 
this proposal – sent a joint letter to the EU stressing 
that their participation was conditional upon 
reception centres providing “adequate, safe and 
dignified reception conditions”.15
A more powerful Frontex agency will 
not be the catch-all solution to reduce 
migratory pressures.
•  On the political front, calls for more stringent 
border controls are often a way of expressing a 
preference for fewer migrant arrivals in the EU, 
including from asylum seekers. However, a more 
powerful Frontex agency will not be the catch-all 
solution to reduce migratory pressures. If the EU 
wants to regain credibility in the migration field, 
it needs to adopt a strategy that combines strong 
borders and a strengthened Frontex with proactive 
support for states with migratory pressures and 
large refugee populations inside and outside the 
EU. Within the EU, such an approach would imply 
the reform of the Dublin system towards a fairer 
distribution of asylum seekers.  Outside the EU, 
the Union needs to continue to employ its tools in 
the areas of trade, foreign policy and development 
in order to help countries with large refugee 
populations and strong migratory pressures. 
All in all, the proposal for 10,000 new border guards for 
Frontex has sparked intense discussions about what 
kind of border management the EU and its member 
states want. However, no one should fall in the trap of 
thinking that pouring more resources into Frontex will 
automatically result in (i) the end of the polarisation of 
the migration debate in Europe, and (ii) fewer asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants. Indeed, the current 
heated and polarised debate is convenient for populist 
parties who use it to mobilise voters. In the ‘post-
truth’ public debates they direct, actual numbers and 
developments do not have the importance they once 
used to have. While tempting to look at border control 
as the low hanging fruit that populists have also been 
focusing on, the EU would be better served if it refused 
to view migration solely through the prism of border 
control. A functioning asylum policy with a clear idea 
of how to distribute asylum seekers within Europe and 
contribute to international burden sharing will be an 
equally important element. 
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